Price search, bargaining and agglomeration by Kopp, Andreas
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Kopp, Andreas
Working Paper
Price search, bargaining and
agglomeration
Kiel Working Papers, No. 618
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Kopp, Andreas (1994) : Price search, bargaining and agglomeration, Kiel
Working Papers, No. 618, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47169Kieler Arbeit spapiere
Kiel Working Papers
Kiel Working Paper No. 618
Price Search, Bargaining and Agglomeration
by Andreas Kopp
March 1994
Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel
The Kiel Institute of World Economics
ISSN 0342 - 0787The Kiel Institute of World Economics
Dusternbrocker Weg 120
D-24100 Kiel




Kiel Working Paper No. 618




The authors themselves, not the Kiel Institute of World Economics, are responsible for
the contents and distribution of Kiel Working Papers.
Since the series involves manuscripts in a preliminary form, interested reader are kindly
requested to direct criticism and suggestions directly to the authors and to clear any
quotations with them.1. Introduction
The main idea of this contribution is that the geographic concentration of firms selling a
homogeneous product can be explained by consumers' imperfect information. Imper-
fectly informed consumers tend to turn to clusters of sellers because the clusters provide
a superior setting for search. This advantage may outweigh higher transportation costs
due to neglecting dispersed suppliers being closer to the consumers' locations. On the
firms' side it may overcompensate the centrifugal forces which are central to the tradi-
tional models of spatial competition.
The general model of price determination is based on the bargaining and search model of
Wolinsky (1987). That is, the price determination is the result of bilateral bargaining be-
tween producers and consumers who both have the opportunity to search for alternatives
during the process of price negotiations. Delays of finding a bargaining solution imply
bargaining costs on the firms' and the consumers' side. Moving to other locations in
search for bargaining opportunities leads additionally to transportation costs for the con-
That is, in contrast to other models of spatial competition with perfect price information,
referring to Hotelling's path breaking article, it is not assumed that the sellers set prices
and the consumers act as price takers. These assumptions allow to side-step any bargain-
ing problem by presuming that sellers can commit themselves to prices while consumers
cannot. If, as is introduced by the usual assumption of "mill pricing", the consumers have
to bear the transportation costs, firms do not act strictly rational: They could gain by de-
manding higher prices than originally announced after the consumers have incurred the
sunk transportation costs. If commitment of the firms is impossible a bargaining ap-
proach to price determination is more appropriate, an example being the model of Bester
(1989). Bester has shown that adopting a non-cooperative bargaining approach solves
the notorious problem of the existence of a price equilibrium in models of spatial compe-
tition.
An analogous argument has been made with respect to search theory in general and price
search in particular. Diamond (1971) noticed that if search is costly, consumers' valu-
ation is greater than the net costs of production, firms just quote prices too buyers andbuyers just decide whether to accept this offer all firms would charge prices such that
they appropriate all of the surplus of consumers' valuations over the production costs:
Let p be the lowest price charged by any store, and let k be the cost of searching again.
Then the firm charging p can increase its profits by increasing its price slightly; if it raises
the price by less than k, no customer who has turned to the firm will refuse to buy. Any
one who did would have to pay the search cost k and will save less than k by searching
again. That is, the slight increase of the price would not reduce the number of sales and
hence increase profits. As this argument holds for all firms there is no equilibrium in
which any firm charges a price less than the consumer's valuation. If, on the other hand,
only consumers were able to make commitments they would get the whole surplus.
From this follows that also a complete analysis of the process of how spatial agglomera-
tions can be due to incomplete price formation has to rely on a combination of search
and bargaining theory. Wolinsky developed a model with uncertainty on product quality
in a market of horizontally differentiated products. The price determination was modelled
by adopting Salop's (1979) model of monopolistic competition in a horizontally differen-
tiated industry. Apart from the fact that the model can be criticised because of the as-
sumption that firms can commit to prices, Economides (1989) has pointed out that the
model lacks a full-fledged stage of choice of varieties, but allowed only for a symmetric
configuration of varieties. He showed that if the choice of varieties is completely taken
account of there is no existence of any price subgame, although an equilibrium exists in
the price subgame defined by a symmetric equilibrium configuration of varieties pro-
duced.
The approach chosen here thus provides a general framework which can treat a broad
class of spatial oligopolistic competition models in a unifying manner (cf. Fujita 1990)
without having to resort to a number of ad hoc assumptions which have been employed
the ensure the existence of the price equilibrium of the Hotelling model. What is more, it
does not exclude the "principle of minimum differentiation" to hold.
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In this paper, the analysis concentrates on consumers' imperfect information in goods'
prices in a market for a homogeneous good. This market serves a geographical area.
Firms can be located throughout it, and the consumers residing in the area bear the
transportation costs as they search for the lowest price. It will be shown that, under cer-
1 For an appreciation of the more general importance of the type of model used here cf. Diamond
1994, ch. 2.tain conditions concerning the size of the market region and the number of consumers,
there exists a price-location equilibrium with all firms agglomerating at one point. In the
next section the general model of spatial competition in a search cum bargaining frame-
work will be developed. This will be done by first presenting the time structure of the
bargaining and search process, then isolating the search process in detail before looking
at the equilibrium of the bargaining and search process. In the third subsection the geo-
graphical dimension is added leading to the main result of the paper.
2. Monopolistic price competition with imperfect information
2.1 Structure of the search and bargaining process
The process of information gathering on goods' prices is confined here to the simple case
where information is exclusively gained by visiting firms sequentially, combining the
costs of collecting goods and of gathering information. For simplicity, search is modelled
in the classical way: individuals get, by bearing search costs k, the opportunity to take a
random sample from a distribution F() of economic opportunities with non-negative val-
ues over the support [0, m
+]. The search cost is assumed to depend on the search inten-
sity chosen, i. e. there is a search cost function k(s), which is twice differentiate, k' > 0,
k" > 0 and k being bounded away from zero for all s > 0. In what follows the opportunity
consists of striking a bargain on the difference of the valuations of the firm and the buyer.
This surplus is revealed after the parties have met. The bargaining process takes place
over time; the time periods are denoted by t=0,1,2,3... At the beginning of each period t
for those parties that enter a bargaining stage a chance move determines who has the
right (with probability 1/2 and independently of previous selections) to propose a parti-
tion of the surplus m.
2 The other bargaining partner responds immediately by accepting
the offer or rejecting it. If the offer is accepted, it is implemented and the game ends.
Upon rejection the parties proceed into the search stage of period t. in this stage the par-
ties i (i=l,2) choose first their search intensities s[ and incur the costs k(s|) A, A denoting
the length of the discrete time period. The search activities enable both bargaining part-
ners to assess their "outside opportunities". Consequently, what the parties have to ex-
pect in case of disagreement is not fixed and given, like in axiomatic bargaining theory,
but depends on the behaviour and in particular the choice of search intensities of all
This assumption serves to avoid the arbitrary assignment of the first mover advantage to either the
firms or the consumers.agents. Upon encountering an outside opportunity a party finds out its value and decides
immediately whether or not to adopt it. As a party can participate only in one bargaining
process at a time, the adoption of an outside opportunity ends the original bargaining
game: The person withdraws from the bargaining and does not search for further oppor-
tunities. If both parties do not adopt their outside opportunities, they will proceed into
the bargaining stage of period t+1. The bargaining partners are assumed to be utility
maximisers, discounting future utilities. The distribution function of bargaining opportu-
nities F(), the preferences as captured by the discount factors 8{ (i=l,2) and the search
cost functions kj(s) are common knowledge. The parties, however, do not observe the
search intensities of the rival and the timing and values of the outside options she or he
has encountered.
To summarise the order of events of the bargaining and search process: At each time pe-
riod there are four consecutive instances at which a party might have to make a decision.
She or he has to decide: (1) What proposal to make (if the bargaining was resumed and
the party was selected to propose); (2) whether or not to accept the partner's proposal (if
the other party was selected to propose); (3) which search intensity to employ (if no
agreement was reached); (4) whether or not to adopt an outside opportunity (if such has
been met). Strategies in this game are sequences of decision rules which describe the
party's behaviour at each time period and each of the decision points (1) to (4), condi-
tional on that party's history up to that point. An equilibrium is obtained if the strategy of
each bargaining partner is the best reply to the other agent's strategy after any possible
history of the game.
2.2 Equilibrium analysis
For the equilibrium analysis it is assumed that there are N, firms and N2 buyers. N, and
N2 are assumed to be large such that strategic interactions between agents on one side of
the market can be neglected. Specifically, it is assumed that opportunities arrive as a
Poisson process with a certain arrival rate s. A person searching with an intensity s for a
period of length A in curs search costs of k(s) A. The Poisson assumption means that in a
short time interval A the probability that precisely one opportunity arrives is exactly s +
a(A). For simplicity A is chosen to be so small that the a(A) possibility that more than
one opportunity arrives in A can be neglected.Let V* denote the value of a search if the player follows an optimal strategy. The timing
of the search activity is such that costs are incurred immediately, and benefits from
search are received in the next period. The searcher discounts future benefits using the
discount factor 8. V* must then satisfy
V* = sA-8Jmax[m,V*]dF(y)-k(s)A. (1)
That is, searching for outside opportunities the searcher accepts bargaining situations
where the surplus m implies a value greater or equal to V*. Otherwise she or he contin-
ues to search. As long as this search problem is stationary, i. e. the searcher's situation in
terms of the distribution function F( ) and the search cost function k(s) is constant, this
reservation value property is maintained.
Switching to a continuous time formulation and replacing the discount factor 8 by the
function e~
r
A with r denoting the agent's instantaneous rate of time preference, we obtain
the following general expression for the value of searching:
V(s,x) = e"
rA|fl-sA + sAF(x)]V(s,x) + sAfydF(y)Uk(s)A (2)
x denotes the cut-off value for the surplus at which the agent is indifferent between what
has been obtained and continuing to search. In each period the probability that the next
draw will show a surplus higher than x and hence accepted is equal to sA(l-F(x)). With
probability [1-SA+SAF(X)] the searcher will encounter a bargaining surplus lower than x,
reject the opportunity and be back where she or he started with an expected value of
V(s,x). The search cost k(s) is incurred immediately independently of the realisation of
the random variable.
Further simplifying by approximating e"
r^ by the linear function 1-rA, and choosing A so
small that we can discard all A




 x ( , . (3)
r + s(l-F(x)JLet x be the optimal cut-off value, i. e. the value of x which maximises V(s,x). Then it is
easy to verify (by differentiating equation (3) and setting the derivative equal to zero)
that V(s,x*) = x*. We can then derive the implicit solution for x*:
x*(l + r) = x*+sJ(y-x*)dF(y)-k(s),or (4)
rV(s,x*) = sJ(y-x*)dF(y)-k(s). (5)
The optimal reservation value for the bargaining surplus establishes the equivalence of
keeping x now or searching again incurring the search costs and enjoying the expected
improvement compared to what has been obtained up to now.
From equation (4) we can easily choose the optimal search intensity s . The s maximis-
ing V(s,x*) is implicitly given by
k'(s) = J(y-x*)dF(y). (6)
Turning now to the search and bargaining process, we have the agents on both sides of
the market choosing their search intensities s; (i=l,2), s; indicating the probability that,
within a unit interval of time, the searcher initiates a contact with an agent of the oppo-
site type. Search activity costs kj(S;) per unit of time, kj having the properties defined
above. s° be the probability per unit of time that the type i agent is contacted as a result
of the search activity on the opposite side of the market. Given the numbers of firms and
consumers we have
(7)
Having assumed that firms as well as buyers are many, the probability that a type i agent
finds a partner is (s; + sf) per unit of time. It is assumed that there is common rate of
time preference r. Additionally, let the (exogenous) rate of entry of new searchers equal
the (endogenous) rate of exit as agreements are made.The equilibrium of the game is characterised by an agreement (w,(m), w2(m)} that di-
vides the surplus of a certain match m. w;(m) (i=l,2) denotes the actual payoff of the
player i. Following the discussion in the introduction, it is assumed that none of the play-
ers can make commitments. Instead it is required that they behave in a subgame-perfect
way. The perfect equilibrium is derived by combining the techniques of the optimal
search decision which is elaborated above with the backward-induction method of find-
ing the perfect equilibrium of a non-cooperative bargaining model (Binmore et al. 1992).
Every player chooses the reservation value ni; and the search intensity according to the
above model. This implies that the searcher accepts the first opportunity whose surplus
exceeds nij. Let V(s;, n^; sf) denote the discounted present value of such a search policy.




Now, a player being at the stage of searching may find herself or himself in two different
situations: Either the searcher is without a partner or is in a search stage of the bargain-
ing cum search process as described under 2.1. For those who are unmatched we may
define:
(9)
The choices of the optimal reservation value and the search intensity characterise optimal
search by an agent who is unmatched, given sf, w;(m) and F( ). It is evident that a bar-
gaining process will be initiated only if m > V* + V,*.
A searcher who looks for outside opportunities being in an ongoing bargaining process
has to take a simpler decision: His reservation value is fixed at the surplus level she or he
has already found. This surplus level must exceed the above m*, otherwise the player
would have rejected the opportunity. The players already matched have only to decide on
the search intensity s** which is implicitly given by the following equation:
j[wl(x)-w1(m)]dF(x) = k',(s1). (10)Since m > m*, this equation implies a lower search intensity s** < s*. The expected return
of an optimal search in case of an agent being unmatched is then denoted by
V** = V,(s",m;s°).
The results of the analyses of the searches in an unmatched or matched position are then
used to determine the definite bargaining agreement. Using the general results on se-
quential noncooperative bargaining games (Binmore et al. 1992), we have as the division
of the surplus at a perfect equilibrium:
w,(m) = ± '—^ '—lA^-) = ia, (11)
where d;(m) (i=l,2) is a weighted average of the returns from the two kinds of search:
The weights a; reflect the search intensities, the discount rate, and the probability of
finding a better match:
(13)
r +
To interpret equation (11) we may now recall the fact that the limiting perfect equilib-
rium in a sequential bargaining game is identical to the Nash cooperative bargaining so-
lution, provided that the disagreement points for the Nash solution are appropriately
chosen. Equation (11) defines the Nash cooperative bargaining solution fur dividing the
sum m with the disagreement point (d,, d2). Equation (12) defines the disagreement
points to be a weighted average of Vj* and V** as developed above. The weights in turn
depend on the instantaneous rate of time preference of the players, the search intensities
chosen and the distribution function of the bargaining surplus. Additionally, the search
costs determine the opportunity costs of a disagreement. The player with lower costs of
finding a new partner is in an advantageous position. Hence, the bargaining result de-
pends on both the costs and expected benefits of search as well as the chances of
bargaining in a given match.3. The geographical consequences of search in a spatial market
Turning to the geographical dimension we recall that the market under consideration is
assumed to serve an inhabited area throughout which firms can locate. Consumers are
characterised by their willingness to pay for the homogeneous good and their residential
location. If the location of a firm differs from the residential location of the consumer,
consumption will involve transportation costs. The transportation costs are assumed to
be a linear function of the distance between the locations of the firm and the consumer, t
denoting the unit transportation cost and D the distance. A single point of the market
area can accommodate more than one firm, in fact an arbitrary number of firms. Con-
sumers are assumed to know the number of firms at each location and use this informa-
tion in planning their search.
To put forward the argument that under certain conditions price uncertainty and the
search behaviour of consumers will lead to single agglomeration in the market area under
consideration, it suffices to look at a very simple geographical configuration as depicted
in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Geographical configuration of n+1 firms
There are n + 1 firms, n of them located in one geographic point denoted h,. The remain-
ing firm is located at h2 at a travelling distance of d from h,. The decision problem of the
consumers is discussed in terms of the problem of one consumer who resides in a, at
travelling distances D, and D2 from h, and h2, respectively. The consumer seeks a search10
plan that will maximise his net expected benefit, given his expectations on the distribution
of bargaining surpluses
The search plan consists of a decision on where to start, i. e. at the agglomeration or at
the isolated firm and on when to stop searching. Starting the search process at h2, it will
be continued only if the expected gain from continuing search covers the search costs
plus the transportation costs t d. This implies that the reservation value of the accepted
bargaining surplus at h2, m/ (i-1,2) will be lower than what has been developed above
for a point market. Consequently, the probability of stopping the search process [1-
F(mj
1)] will be higher.
If the search process starts at h,, the next (n-1) search acts do not entail transportation
costs. That is, for the search process within the cluster hf we will have the reservation
value m as determined above in the general discussion of the search and bargaining proc-
ess. For the n-th search there will again be a lower m/.
The reservation value m/ depends on the distance d between h, and h2 as well as the
number of firms in the agglomeration. The more firms are located in h,, the more attrac-
tive is the search process at h,. The shorter the distance d between the two firms' loca-
tions the higher will be mj. This follows from the fact that with a decrease in d the pro-
pensity to continue search at the second location increases.
In what follows it will be shown that, depending on the distance between h, and h2 and
the number of firms in h,, it may be advantageous for the consumers to directly move to
the agglomeration even if the consumer lives closer to the single firm location and even if
she or he has to pass h2 on the way to the cluster. The argument holds without taking ac-
count of the fact that for a given m the bargaining power of the consumers (measured by
the a; influencing the disagreement payoffs in the general expressions for the results of
the search cum bargaining game) is greater in the cluster. It holds a forteriori if the dif-
ferences in bargaining power are considered as well. The argument rests on a comparison
of the expected transportation costs T, for the search plan starting at the single firm lo-
cation h2 and those, denoted Tn, resulting from starting the search at h,. The expression
for the transportation costs Tj is:
3
The > holds because a return to h2 after having searched in h, is neglected.11
T, >tD2+(l-F(m'1))tD:;+F(m'1)td + F(m1)tD1 (14)
The first term on the right hand side refers to the costs of moving from a to h2, the sec-
ond to the expected costs of moving back to a after stopping the search there, the third
expression refers to the expected transportation costs of moving on to the cluster, the
fourth to expected costs of the return to a from h,.
The expression for the search plan starting at the n-firrn location is:
Tn < tD, + [l - F(m^ )F(m)
n




l (1 - F(m))tD2 + F(m; )F(m)
n(td + tD,)
•\
The first term on the right hand side indicates the costs of moving from a to the location
h,, the second term the expected costs of moving back to a after having settled for a buy
in h,, the third one those of moving on to the second location, the fourth one those of
buying in h2 and returning to the residential location and the fourth the expected costs of
being disappointed in h2 and moving back to h, and only then to the residential location
Now, the consumer being located at a would directly move to the cluster if T, is greater
than Tn. The algebraic expression for the difference between the expected transportation
costs is:
T, -Tn>t(D2+d-D,)
(l-F(m;)] + F(m;) + l + [l-F(m;)F(m)
n-'] + F(m;)F(m)
n} (16)
+F(m; )tD, - F(m; )F(m)
n
l td - F(m, )F(m)
n
l (l - F(m))tD2 - F(m', )F(m)
n td
The product in the first two rows of (16) is necessarily non-negative. It would just be
zero for consumers who reside on the extension of the straight line between h, and h2. If
the inequality holds for the third row of the right hand side only, it holds a forteriori if we
add again the product in the first two rows. If n gets very large the terms with the nega-
tive signs in the third row will get very small such that because of the positive F(mj')tD,
the whole expression becomes positive. That is for a given d there is a critical n that will12
lead to a T, that is greater than Tn. That is the consumer, also those passing h2 will go di-
rectly to the agglomeration.
The greater the number of firms in the agglomeration, the larger can be the distance be-
tween hj and h2, without removing the result that the consumer goes directly to the clus-
ter. Hence there is a critical distance d*(n) compatible with the above inequality, looking
only at the third row of the inequality (16). There is a number N of firms which ensures
the inequality even if d converges to zero. From this follows that for n>N there is a dis-
tance d(n) > 0 such that for all d < d(n) the consumers go directly to the cluster. If the
whole market area lies within the distance d(n) from the cluster, then the number of n+1
firms in the agglomeration ensures that no firm can leave the cluster or no additional firm
can enter the market and meet positive demand.
4. Conclusion
In this paper it is shown that consumers' imperfect information on goods prices may lead
to a single agglomeration within a spatial market. Spatial competition is modelled as a
search cum bargaining game with mill pricing and the consumers bearing the transporta-
tion costs. The bargaining approach to price determination avoids the problems of the
existence of a unique equilibrium of spatial competition. The search process refers to the
surplus to be divided by bargaining between the seller and the buyer. Conditions referring
to the number of firms in an agglomeration and distances between firms' locations leading
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